This article argues that governments should plan to use collaboration on natural disasters as a vehicle for developing the institutional capacity to manage the global climate.
This essay examines the existing international governance structures to address geoengineering and concludes that they are inadequate to the task and makes recommendations for structural adaptations in international governance to address the problem.
This article examines the critical question of whether geoengineering presents a moral hazard by drawing on empirical studies of moral hazard and risk compensation and on the psychology literature of heuristics and cultural cognition.
This article provides an overview of debate in how to apply the precautionary principle to climate engineering (in part carbon dioxide removal) and what the precautionary principle means in a climate engineering context.
This article explores new ways to regulate climate engineering research through a cumulative bottom-up governance approach that would rely on networks of regional treaties, agreements and resolutions rather than a sweeping international convention.
The article shows how regulating geoengineering activities, including ocean iron fertilization, through existing environmental protection regimes may lead to a governance and legal landscape that is fragmented, incoherent, and incomprehensive.