Summary/Abstract
This paper investigates the definitions and use of the term ‘moral hazard’, and the related (but significantly different) concept of ‘morale hazard’, in the context of geoengineering and in relevant law, economic and insurance literatures. It finds that ‘moral hazard’ has been generally misapplied in discussions of geoengineering, which perhaps explains unexpected difficulties in detecting expected effects experimentally. The paper clarifies relevant usage of the terms, identifying scenarios that can properly be described as moral hazard (malfeasance), and morale hazard (lack of caution or recklessness). It notes generally the importance of correctly applying this distinction when discussing geoengineering. And in conclusion, the paper notes that a proper consideration of the risks of both moral and morale hazards allows one to easily segment framings for both geoengineering advocacy and the advocate groups who rely on these framings.